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Abstract 
In a fragmented digital media environment where news is increasingly encountered passively in 
social media feeds and via automated mobile alerts, active avoidance of news, rather than 
deliberate consumption, takes on outsized importance in shaping what it means to be an informed 
citizen. This article systematically evaluates the factors that predict news avoidance behaviors, 
considering both individual- and country-level explanations. Using a large-scale quantitative, 
comparative approach, we examine more than 67,000 survey respondents across 35 countries 
worldwide and find consistent evidence for how factors including demographics, political attitudes, 
and news genre preferences shape avoidance consistently across information environments. But we 
also show how country-level contextual factors, what we call “cultures of news consumption,” 
influence behaviors above and beyond that which is explained by respondent-level differences. 
Specifically levels of press freedom and political freedom and stability are shown to negatively 
predict rates of news avoidance. These findings suggest that many people’s news use practices 
depend not only on personal characteristics and preferences but quite sensibly on the news 
available to them, which they may have good reason to view as deficient or untrustworthy, as well 
as culturally-specific norms around its value and utility. 
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News consumption has long been associated with normative models of good citizenship 
(McCombs and Poindexter 1983; Lupia 2015; Schudson 1998). As Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996, 
8) argue, “Political information is to democratic politics what money is to economics: it is the 
currency of citizenship.” Beyond its benefits to individuals in enabling full participation in political 
life, democratic self-governance also depends on a collectively informed and knowledgeable 
electorate able to hold their elected officials accountable, and news is often viewed as the most 
critical link to politically-relevant information in the public sphere (Habermas 1989).  
Scholars have grown increasingly concerned about how changing media environments may 
contribute to gaps between those who do and do not pay attention to news and whether such gaps 
may threaten processes of representative democracy (Prior 2007; Van Aelst et al. 2017). In media 
environments where people see news as ambient and ubiquitous (Gil de Zúñiga, Weeks, and 
Ardèvol-Abreu 2017; Hermida 2010), deliberate avoidance of news may take on outsized 
importance in shaping what it means to be an informed citizen for news enthusiasts and habitual 
avoiders alike. The contemporary digital media landscape has made information more widely 
available and accessible than ever before, yet in some high-income democracies with well-educated 
populations, considerable numbers report never accessing conventional news altogether (Newman 
et al. 2017) and/or appear to avoid it with some regularity (Ksiazek, Malthouse, and Webster 2010).  
In this article, we systematically evaluate the factors that predict news avoidance among the 
general public, considering not only individual-level explanations for why some people avoid news 
more so than others but also country-level factors pertaining to the information environment often 
emphasized in scholarship on international media systems. By examining large-scale survey 
responses across 35 countries, we find evidence that many individual-level variables—including 
certain demographics, political attitudes, preferences for “soft” versus “hard” news topics, and 
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social media use—are relatively consistent predictors of news avoidance across countries, but we 
also find that political information environments, what we call national “cultures of news 
consumption,” play a significant role in shaping audience behaviors beyond what is explained by 
individual-level factors alone. That is, unlike previous scholarship, which has emphasized 
characteristics of the news environments such as differences in journalistic practices (Hanusch and 
Hanitzsch 2017) or the variety of media sources available, we find that levels of freedom and 
political stability better explain cross-country differences in rates of avoidance. These results 
suggest that many people may avoid the news not solely because of personal preferences but 
because of perceived deficiencies in their country’s available supply of news and information.  
Previous Research on News Avoidance 
 
A small but growing literature on media audiences has recently developed that seeks to investigate 
the phenomenon of “news avoidance.” News avoidance has been operationalized in varying ways 
in previous studies (for review, see Skovsgaard and Andersen 2019). Researchers often focus on 
instances of habitual avoidance among people who “resist” news (Woodstock 2014) or otherwise 
abstain from it almost entirely (Edgerly 2017; Toff and Nielsen 2018; Trilling and Schoenbach 
2013). Other studies characterize news avoiders as a category of individuals who differ mainly 
from the general public in the extremity of their limited use of news (Blekesaune, Elvestad, 
Aalberg 2012; Ksiazek, Malthouse, and Webster 2010; Lee and Yang 2014). In this study, we 
define news avoidance more broadly as a behavior—an intermittent practice that may occur at 
differing rates among the public separate from overall rates of news exposure. The two behaviors 
are clearly intertwined, but they are not one in the same as even news enthusiasts may also 
routinely avoid news. In this study, we refer to “active” avoidance to differentiate such behaviors 
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from avoidance practices that may occur inadvertently for structural reasons even though we 
recognize that many instances of news exposure are not entirely intentional or unintentional.1  
Like many studies of news audiences, previous work examining news avoidance has often 
focused on (1) individual-level factors, such as predictors pertaining to individuals’ access to 
resources like time and money or personal preferences, or (2) country-level explanations, which 
tend to involve matters external to individuals involving the supply of news, what is sometimes 
called the “political information environment” (Aalberg et al. 2010). Here we review findings in 
both areas and build on previous work that argues for an integrative approach the considers these 
factors alongside each other. 
Individual-level Explanations for News Avoidance  
Previous research on news use focusing on single countries has often highlighted 
individual-level characteristics as the primary factors shaping news consumption. Studies typically 
emphasize the role of age and socialization (Edgerly et al 2017), political interest (Strömbäck and 
Shehata 2019), and gender norms (Toff and Palmer 2018) in structuring people’s news habits and 
media routines. Studies have also pointed to education and “preexisting levels of background 
knowledge” (Price and Zaller 1993, 133), although effects vary depending on how narrowly or 
specifically news is defined (Lee 2013; Strömbäck and Shehata 2019). Some who use little “hard” 
news are nonetheless exposed to considerable “soft” news content which can be nonetheless 
                                                 
1 This term is subject to interpretation by respondents and may mean different things to different 
individuals depending on what form of news they typically consume (e.g., television, newspaper, 
online news). Some extreme news avoiders who habitually consume little to no news at all may or 
may not do so “actively.” For a fuller discussion, see Skovsgaard and Andersen (2019). 
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somewhat informative (Baum and Jamison 2006). Others, such as Norris (2000) and Strömbäck 
and Shehata (2010, 2019) have pointed to the causal and reciprocal relationship that develops 
among habitual news users in fostering a “virtuous circle” of interest in political and civic affairs—
although as Avery (2009) finds, pre-existing levels of media trust can moderate this relationship. 
This literature contrasts with a separate body of work on “media malaise” or “video-malaise” 
(Robinson 1976, Mutz and Reeves 2005), which posits that exposure to certain forms of news 
media content can cause people to become cynical and disengage with political and civic affairs. In 
other words, all news is not created equally; some individual-level correlates of news use may 
differ from place to place as the information environment itself differs. 
This view of news audiences aligns with an influential and extensive literature in political 
communication concerned with the tendency of people to selectively expose themselves to or turn 
away from certain forms of news in accordance with partisan loyalties (Stroud 2011; Garrett and 
Stroud 2014) or preferences for soft news (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009) or entertainment (Prior 2007). In 
an increasingly fragmented environment, it is easier for people uninterested in particular types of 
niche news (or any news whatsoever) to filter out what they do not like. Strömbäck et al (2013) 
showed that as the information environment has fragmented over time, political interest has 
become a stronger predicter of news consumption. Thus, the main concerns about the high choice 
environment is that large parts of the population will either be isolated from news or consume only 
like-minded partisan news, as shown in Edgerly’s (2015) work on news repertoires. 
Similar patterns should in theory apply to avoidance practices; however, this conception of 
audiences implies significant differences may be apparent across countries as individuals encounter 
differing media choices available to them. In addition, the way we consume news today 
complicates these relationships. The increasing use of social media and search engines for news 
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allows users to be exposed to news stories from outlets that they would not necessarily consume 
otherwise. As a result, the effect of partisan selective exposure may be reduced (Messing and 
Westwood 2014) and social media news users may actually consume news from more and more 
ideologically diverse news sources (Fletcher and Nielsen 2018a; 2018b). Thus, the way digital 
technologies are used for news complicates our theories of how people tend to deliberately seek out 
or avoid news. 
Cultures of News Consumption at the Country Level 
Assessing to what degree the above explanations apply across political information 
environments is challenging since many news audience studies are conducted in single countries. 
Factors that appear to drive individuals to employ different media habits and news repertoires 
(Edgerly 2015; Schrøder 2015) may omit the variables that structure the information environments 
in which people interact and engage with media. These include both the penetration of different 
media technologies in a given country (e.g., Elvestad and Blekesaune 2008; Kim and Webster 
2012) as well as more difficult to capture aspects of what political scientists sometimes describe as 
political or civic cultures (e.g., Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1988). We call these contextual 
factors “cultures of news consumption,” which we define as group-level social, cultural, or political 
forces that pertain to the supply of available media choices, perceptions about their accuracy and 
utility, as well as norms about the value of news consumption as a civic duty (McCombs and 
Poindexter 1983).2 These cultures of news consumption encompass a greater range of 
                                                 
2 A single country could contain multiple cultures of news consumption but systematic differences 
in how such cultures aggregate are likely to result in observable country-level differences in 
collective patterns of information seeking and avoidance.  
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characteristics than those typically captured in studies of political information environments, which 
usually focus on the quality and quantity of information in the news (Aalberg et al 2010) or the 
dominant modes in which news is distributed (Elvestad and Blekesaune 2008; Shahata and 
Strömbäck 2011). Technological differences from country to country such as the availability of 
social media may well co-vary with cultures of news consumption, but these differences are 
unlikely to deterministically shape behaviors absent changes in the culture.  
We are by no means the first to highlight the importance of these contextual factors. For 
example, previous scholarship has examined how local (Althaus, Cizmar, and Gimpel 2009; Hayes 
and Lawless 2018) and national (Aalberg, Blekesaune, and Elvestad 2013) contexts play an 
important role in predicting news consumption and knowledge, with particular importance ascribed 
to how newspaper-centric a country’s media landscape is (Elvestad & Blekesaune 2008; Shahata 
and Strömbäck 2011). The burgeoning field of comparative media systems research, building on 
Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) influential framework, has often emphasized Public Service 
Broadcasters (PSBs) as a bulwark to creeping commercialization across media systems, 
contributing to citizens’ greater knowledge of civic and political affairs (Aalberg, Van Aelst, and 
Curran 2010; Esser et al 2012; Strömbäck 2017). When PSBs are a country’s dominant delivery 
mechanism for news, citizens tend to be more informed and engage in politics at higher rates.  
But as Brüggemann et al. (2014) note in their re-conceptualization of the Hallin and 
Mancini typology, PSBs are just one of several factors that pertain to the “role of the state” in a 
given media system—and by extension its particular culture of news consumption. Country-level 
political and press freedoms are also likely to interact with and extend beyond the influence of 
PSBs alone. After all, countries where PSBs are most dominant also tend to be high-income 
democracies with strong traditions of press freedom and political stability; whereas countries with 
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high rates of political parallelism, such as Spain or Greece, often also have lower levels of 
journalistic professionalism and more unstable political systems (Brüggemann et al. 2014). 
Although some work has begun to examine audience behaviors such as incidental exposure 
(Fletcher and Nielsen 2018a; Valeriani and Vaccari 2016) or other patterns of media use 
(Hasebrink et al 2015; Perusko, Vozab, and Čuvalo 2015) across a small number of mostly 
European countries, existing research does not provide guidance for how country-level 
characteristics such as levels of political freedom and stability may impact rates of news use and 
avoidance. Competing hypotheses offer at least two plausible possibilities. Since most people are 
unlikely to exert the cognitive effort required to stay informed and make political decisions (Downs 
1957; Popkin 1994), in information environments in which news is perceived to be less reliable 
and/or consequential, where governments exhibit less regard for the democratic preferences of the 
public, cultures of news consumption may develop in which people are more likely to avoid paying 
attention to news since it is perceived as less useful. This would manifest in a negative relationship 
between avoidance and levels of press and political freedom. On the other hand, controlled 
experiments have also shown how political instability and threats to political freedom contribute to 
a more anxious and information-seeking public (e.g., Albertson and Gadarian 2015; Best and 
Krueger 2011; Valentino et al. 2008; 2009), which could prompt the opposite effect, or cultures of 
news consumption where avoidance is less common.  
Further complicating these expectations is the challenge of disentangling the separate, 
independent effects of press and political freedoms on news audience behaviors. As Hanitzsch and 
Berganza (2012) find, journalists themselves tend to be more trusting toward public institutions 
when they work under conditions of relative press freedom. At the same time, scholars have often 
pointed to the effects a strong press system may have on curtailing corruption (see Brunetti and 
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Weder 2003) as evidence of the primary role played by press freedom in establishing the conditions 
for political freedom to flourish. In practice, given how levels of press freedom co-vary with 
country-level political freedoms, investigating the precise independent effects attributed to each of 
these factors may not be possible. For purposes of this study, our aim is to demonstrate how 
cultures of news consumption play a role in explaining cross-national variation in audience 
practices, not to comprehensively specify its constituent parts. We return to this point in the 
discussion. 
Research Questions 
In the present study, we ask four specific research questions designed to assess systematic 
predictors of news avoidance. In the analysis that follows, we test these factors side-by-side as 
explanations for why some people avoid news at rates higher than others from one country to the 
next. The first of these questions seeks to build on the first set of theories about individual-level 
variables governing news consumption, examining the degree to which such factors predict news 
avoidance on average across country contexts: 
RQ1. What demographic and attitudinal factors at the individual-level are associated with 
higher rates of news avoidance cross-nationally? 
Although we have specific expectations about several demographic variables based on prior 
research (e.g., we expect age to be associated with less news avoidance while a relative preference 
for soft news is expected to be associated with more news avoidance), we do not formulate these 
expectations into hypotheses as our larger purpose in this study is not to derive point estimates for 
each characteristic but to assess the degree of cross-country variation with respect to each factor. 
The second, third, and fourth questions consider the role played by country-level factors in 
predicting rates of news avoidance. These questions are: 
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RQ2. To what extent do country-level differences in press freedom contribute to variation 
in news avoidance?  
RQ3. To what extent do levels of political freedom and stability contribute to variation in 
news avoidance? 
RQ4. What is the relationship between rates of news avoidance and other characteristics 
of a country’s supply of news (e.g., PSBs, commercial media, variety of news 
sources)? 
Data and Methods 
In order to analyze news use patterns across a range of country contexts, we drew on a combination 
of several different sources of data spanning multiple continents and political information 
environments. In this section, we describe the main source of survey data used as well as secondary 
data sources gathered and the methods used to examine the questions above. 
Digital News Report Data and Dependent Variable 
We draw primarily on the 2017 Digital News Report (DNR), a large-scale cross-country 
survey of news audiences conducted annually by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism 
(Newman et al. 2017). This online survey, fielded by YouGov, assesses attitudes and behaviors 
involving news and journalism, with a specific focus on digital media. The survey is conducted on 
quota-based representative samples of approximately 2000 respondents in each of the countries 
included in the DNR (N = 67,245; see Figure 1 for a list of the countries).3  
                                                 
3 Singapore was removed from the sample because the variable measuring ideological strength is 
not comparable. A more detailed description of the sample and how country-level populations vary 
according to variables used in this study is provided in the supplementary online appendix. 
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This study’s dependent variable is derived from a question in the 2017 DNR, which asked 
whether respondents found themselves “actively trying to avoid the news these days.” Responses 
were coded on a 0-to-3 scale corresponding to “Never,” “Occasionally,” “Sometimes,” and 
“Often.” Country-level variation in responses to this question were stark: in Greece and Turkey, 
57% of respondents said they sometimes or often avoided the news, whereas rates of avoidance 
were far lower in countries such as Finland (18%), Denmark (14%), and Japan (6%). Although 
“news” is not defined in the prompt, in an earlier question that asks respondents to report how often 
they “typically” access news, the questionnaire does define news as “national, international, 
regional/local news and other topical events accessed via any platform (radio, TV, newspaper or 
online).” The two measures of accessing news and avoiding it are negatively correlated but only 
weakly so (r = -0.11), which suggests that the active avoidance item captures a phenomenon related 
to but distinct from news consumption generally.4 Although we would prefer to operationalize 
news avoidance behaviors using a more extensive battery of questions, which would add greater 
depth to our understanding of how respondents interpret the word “actively” here, we sacrifice 
depth in favor of breadth given the survey’s reach across a wider range of news environments than 
is ordinarily captured in most prior cross-country comparative media research.   
[Figure 1 About Here] 
Respondent-level Measures 
                                                 
4 Supplementary online appendices include a model where this variable is included as a separate 
control (Table B-2) but the inclusion of this variable did not substantively change interpretation of 
any other variable. We exclude it here for parsimony. 
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 We selected individual-level variables from the DNR survey that previous research on 
patterns of news use and avoidance indicated were likely to be associated with systematic audience 
behaviors. These measures are summarized in Table 1 and include both demographics (age, gender, 
and educational attainment) and political attitudes (including self-placement on a left-right 
ideological scale, self-reported perceptions of internal political efficacy and trust in news). In light 
of previous research which has emphasized the importance of media genre preferences (Prior 2007) 
and self-reported interest in politics (Strömbäck, Djerf-Pierre, and Shehata 2013; Strömbäck and 
Shehata 2019), we constructed a variable for relative news genre preferences that serves as a proxy 
for both variables given that relative preferences for entertainment and interest in politics were not 
asked about on the DNR survey. This measure of news interest was created by dividing average 
interest in “soft” news topics such as entertainment and celebrity news by average interest in “hard” 
news topics such as political or international news.5 Lastly, we included two measures for whether 
individuals used social media as a source for news. One captured whether respondents said social 
media was one of the ways they came across news stories during the previous week; slightly more 
than half (m = 0.54) said they had. The other captured whether individuals said social media was 
the “main” way they came across news.  
[Table 1 About Here] 
                                                 
5 Soft news topics included: “Entertainment and celebrity news,” “Lifestyle news (e.g., food, 
fashion, travel, cooking, wellness),” “Health and education news”, “Arts and culture news,” 
“Sports news,” and “Weird news (e.g. funny, bizarre, quirky).” Hard news topics included: 
“International news,” “Political news,” “News about my region, city, or town,” and “Business and 
economic news.” 
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Country-level Measures  
 To evaluate the degree to which country-level factors may influence news avoidance over 
and beyond variation due to individual-level characteristics, we also pulled together additional data 
about the political information environments in which respondents were situated. Specifically, we 
examined three main dimensions: (1) levels of press freedom, (2) levels of political freedom and 
stability, and (3) characteristics of the information environment and media landscape. While some 
of these measures could be estimated using country averages in the DNR data, most measures 
required that we gather secondary data from a range of additional organizations. We summarize 
these additional sources below in Table 2. 
[Table 2 About Here] 
As no single measure captures all dimensions of each category, we gathered multiple 
measures in order to better triangulate on the relevant characteristics. By drawing on a range of 
different sources, we hope to better approximate the relevant country-level constructs. For levels of 
press freedom, we used an index of press freedom published by Reporters Sans Frontières (“World 
Press Freedom Index” 2018), a composite measure of media independence based on two questions 
from the DNR (Newman et al 2017) (Cronbach’s  = 0.91), and an index published by the World 
Bank concerning levels of free expression and other matters pertaining the ability of citizens to 
voice their concerns in the public sphere (Kaufmann and Kraay 2019). As the three measures are 
highly correlated with each other, we also averaged across the three measures to produce a 
composite press freedom variable (Cronbach’s  = 0.89).  
For political freedom, we used an index of democratization published by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (“Democracy Index” 2018), a World Bank measure of countries’ enforcement of 
laws, property rights, and rates of crime and violence (Kaufmann and Kraay 2019), an index of 
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country-level corruption levels published by Transparency International (“Corruption Perceptions 
Index” 2018), and a World Bank measure of political stability (Kaufmann and Kraay 2019). Again 
we created a composite variable for political freedom and stability by averaging across the four 
country-level variables (Cronbach’s  = 0.91).  
Lastly, we measured the political information environment using three additional country-
level measures: the market share of PSBs (“TV-AUD Public service audience market share” 2015), 
newspaper reach as measured by the World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers 
(“World Press Trends Report” 2014), and a measure of the variety of the media environment by 
taking the mean number of news brands DNR respondents in each country said they used online or 
offline during the previous week (Newman et al 2017). For comparability across models, we 
standardized all country-level variables to a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. Correlations 
between country-level variables are reported in the supplementary online appendix (Table A-3). 
Inferential Limitations 
The DNR data is unique in its breadth; however, the survey itself presents some limitations 
for purposes of this study. As YouGov recruited samples deemed to be broadly representative of 
the population of internet users in each country, this means that in countries where internet 
penetration is more limited (e.g., Bulgaria, Mexico, and Brazil) our results may not necessarily 
apply to the broader populations of each country. Nonetheless, as internet use may well be 
correlated with country-level variables of interest, excluding respondents from countries with low 
internet use would significantly reduce variation at the country-level, thereby limiting our ability to 
assess the importance of some country-level characteristics. Therefore, we include all 35 countries 
in the 2017 DNR but do so with an important caveat about the nature of the population represented 
in our data: our results pertain to the online population across these countries. We do not have a 
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strong theoretical view about why the relationship between the factors we study and patterns of 
news avoidance would differ substantially among offline populations. 
Additionally, as the DNR survey seeks to measure news audiences, the Reuters Institute 
regularly screens out individuals who say they regularly access news less frequently than once a 
month. These extreme news avoiders, which range from as little as 1-2% in the Nordic countries to 
7% in the US and UK, are thus excluded from the analysis in this study. As this constitutes a 
relatively small percentage of the sample in each country, our results are not likely to differ very 
much should such individuals have been included. Moreover, by examining active news avoidance 
behaviors among people who otherwise say they occasionally or habitually consume news, our 
approach here improves upon past studies of news avoidance, which categorize individuals as 
avoiders or non-avoiders when in fact, as we show, many news users engage in avoidance 
behaviors some of the time.  
Modeling Strategy 
 
To simultaneously assess the factors that predict respondents’ frequency of news avoidance, 
we estimated several multilevel regression models. This approach also allows us to consider the 
relative importance of various explanations for news avoidance. To examine RQ1, we model 
individual-level factors separately for each country as well as in a multilevel model allowing for 
random intercepts by country. We test for both the direction and magnitude of the coefficients of 
the fixed effects as well as the significance of the variation explained by these individual-level 
factors. Next, to examine RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4, we estimate additional models which include 
country-level covariates along with the individual-level fixed effects.  
We conduct the analysis below in an iterative fashion, fitting models that include a single 
country-level factor and then slowly adding additional country-level factors in order to assess the 
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relative importance of each variable. As many of the country-level variables are closely correlated 
with each other, we do not fit a single model with all variables. 
Results 
We find significant relationships between both individual-level and country-level factors in 
explaining variation in rates of active avoidance of the news. Chief among these factors, we find 
that trust in the news and media genre preferences are among the strongest predictors of active 
news avoidance at the individual-level while a lack of press freedom and political freedom and 
stability are likewise positively correlated with avoidance, accounting for variation related to other 
characteristics of the political media environment. 
RQ1: Role of Individual-level Factors 
First, we calculate the Interclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC), a statistic which measures 
how much of the total variance is explained by group level predictors, in this case country-level 
differences. In a null multilevel model containing only random intercepts by country (Model 1 in 
Table B-1 in Appendix B), we find that the ICC is 7.6%, indicating that country-level differences 
explain a modest amount of variance in avoidance between countries.6  
Next, to assess RQ1, we estimated an additional multilevel model with random intercepts by 
country including covariates for individual-level factors related to news avoidance (Model 1A). We 
find that all but one such variable is statistically significant. As an illustration of how these individual 
effects vary by country, in Figure 2 we plot the relationship between these variables and predicted 
levels of avoidance in both this pooled model and separate linear models estimated for each country.  
                                                 
6 In comparison, Tsfati and Ariely (2014) found country-level intercepts explained 13% of the 
variance in trust in news across a more diverse set of countries. 
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[Figure 2 About Here] 
At the individual-level, we find that younger people (b = -.003, p < .001) and women (b = 
.098, p < .001) systematically avoid news more frequently, although education has no consistent 
relationship with avoidance, which suggests media resistance cuts across socioeconomics. News 
avoidance is however predicted by ideology (b = -0.032, p < .001) with right-leaning individuals 
somewhat less likely to avoid news than those on the left. The magnitude of the effect for ideology 
(d = -0.09) was slightly smaller than that of internal efficacy (d = -0.12), which was also negatively 
associated with news avoidance.7 The two variables measuring social media use were significantly 
related to avoidance but in opposite directions. People who used social media for news were 
somewhat less likely to actively avoid news (b = -0.095, p < .001) although people who relied on 
social media as their main source of news were significantly more likely to say they were actively 
avoiding news (b = 0.150, p < .001).  
The most predictive individual-level variables were those pertaining to perceptions about 
available media choices. Trust in news was inversely related to avoidance (b = -0.127, p < .001) 
whereas people who reported a preference for soft over hard news topics, which likely captures 
political interest as well, were significantly more likely to avoid news (b = 0.137, p < .001). The 
marginal effects of these two variables were -0.26 and 0.25, respectively, larger than any other 
individual-level factor.  
When these individual-level variables were included in the model (Table B-1), the ICC fell 
slightly to 7.3%. This finding suggests that country-level effects continue to explain almost as much 
                                                 
7 Marginal effects compare predicted levels of avoidance for one standard deviation above and 
below a variable’s mean, holding all other variables constant. 
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of the variation in avoidance when we account for individual level factors as when we do not. In 
other words, although many individual-level factors predict rates of news avoidance across countries, 
most country-level differences remain unexplained.  
RQ2: Role of Press Freedom at Country-Level  
In order to assess possible components of the unexplained country-level variance, we 
estimated additional multilevel models containing both individual-level controls and separate 
country-level factors. We start with press freedom, which we operationalized using separate indices 
as well as using a composite variable which averaged across the three measures. Due to concerns 
about multicollinearity (see Table A-3 in the appendix), we examined each of these variables 
separately (Models 2A to 2D in the appendix) and in Figure 3 we plot the relevant coefficients 
alongside each other. Results were generally consistent across measures, deviating minimally from 
the composite average (b = -0.131, p < 0.001). Countries with higher levels of press freedom 
generally exhibited lower rates of news avoidance. Comparing the remaining country-level 
variance explained in these models to the models in the previous section, we find that the addition 
of these country-level variables reduces the variance explained by country-level intercepts by 
approximately a fourth to 5.6%. 
[Figure 3 About Here] 
RQ3: Role of Political Freedom and Stability at Country-Level 
Similar to press freedom, we measured how levels of political freedom and stability are 
correlated to news avoidance. All of our indicators of political freedom and stability were also 
consistently negatively associated with news avoidance (Models 3A to 3E). Countries with lower 
levels of political freedom and/or lower rates of stability exhibited higher levels of news avoidance, 
Running Head: NEWS THAT’S FIT TO IGNORE 
   
21 
all else equal. Coefficients from these models, plotted in Figure 4, were similar in size to models 
containing press freedom measures in the previous section.  
[Figure 4 About Here] 
Averaging across these measures, the composite political freedom/stability measure, which 
we tested in separate models first by itself (3E) and then in a model combined with the composite 
measure of press freedom. While the composite freedom/stability measure was significantly and 
inversely related to news avoidance (b = -0.129, p <0.001), neither variable was significant in a 
combined model due to a high degree of multicollinearity.8 Together the two variables were jointly 
significant (X2[2] = 11.5, p < 0.01). 
RQ4: Role of Political Information Environment at Country-Level 
The last research question looked at the role of the political information environment. We 
examined the effects of the market share of PSBs, newspapers’ reach within countries, and the 
degree of variety in the media environment (as measured by the average number of news brands 
named as sources by respondents in each country). Once again, we found that all the country-level 
variables for the political information environment explained some variation in news avoidance; 
however, effects dissipated when models included additional country-level covariates for press 
freedom or political freedom and stability. In standalone models, the higher the market share of 
PSBs in a country (b = -0.060, p < .05) or the wider the reach of newspapers (b = -0.082, p < .10), 
the less frequently respondents avoided the news but only at borderline levels of statistical 
significance. In the other direction, the greater the number of news sources named in each country, 
the higher the rate of news avoidance (b = 0.101, p < .05), which suggests that variety and choice 
                                                 
8 The two composite measures are very highly correlated (r = 0.94). 
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may contribute to increased tendencies to avoid political information altogether. However, none of 
the three information environment variables were significant in models that also included press 
freedom or political freedom and stability. Coefficients from these multiple specifications are 
plotted in Figure 5.  
[Figure 5 About Here] 
Discussion 
Our analysis weighs the effects of individual- and country-level factors on rates of news 
avoidance across a comparative sample of more than 67,000 respondents across 35 countries. We 
highlight two major contributions from our findings. First, results confirm that news avoidance can 
be partly explained by respondent-level characteristics that are fairly consistent across a wide range 
of countries. Younger individuals, women, people on the left, and those with lower levels of 
internal efficacy or trust in news were significantly more likely to say they were actively avoiding 
news at higher rates. Education was not significantly related to levels of avoidance, but a 
preference for soft news over hard news was among the most predictive, likely reflecting the 
importance of political interest as shown by previous studies (Strömbäck, Djerf-Pierre, and Shehata 
2013; Strömbäck and Shehata 2019).  
The two variables measuring social media use also explained some news avoidance, 
pointing to the importance of factors that transcend both the individual and country context. That 
said, effects of social media variables were relatively small and effectively canceled each other out. 
Using social media for news were associated with a modest reduction in avoidance, but relying on 
it as the main source for news was correlated with more avoidance. It is certainly possible that 
those who say they use social media as their main source for news do so precisely because they are 
actively avoiding conventional sources of news. 
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Second, individual-level variables leave the vast majority of cross-national variation 
unexplained—compelling evidence of the importance of what we call “cultures of news 
consumption.” The second, third, and fourth parts of our analysis demonstrate how particular 
aspects of these news cultures—especially those related to levels of press freedom and political 
freedom and stability—account for roughly a quarter of the country-level variation unexplained by 
individual-level variables alone. In less free and stable countries, the news may be perceived as less 
accurate and therefore less valuable, leading many to avoid it. These effects persist even after 
controlling for differences in media trust, efficacy, and preferences for soft versus hard news 
topics—variables which relate to the country-level context of the media environments which were 
among the most powerful individual-level predictors of avoidance. We also show that 
characteristics of the political information environment emphasized in previous literature such as 
support for PSBs or the reach of domestic newspapers may be somewhat less important to 
explaining cross-country differences than a country’s specific political conditions.  
We do not suggest that the measures included in our study exhaust all dimensions of 
country-level cultures of news consumption. These cultures are likely shaped by other difficult-to-
measure contextual factors such as socialization (Edgerly et al 2017), the impact of political events, 
or even the degree to which people in particular cultures tend to talk openly about and discuss the 
news and conceive of themselves as active participants in democratic life (Almond and Verba 
1963). Some country-level effects may also be driven by differences in survey response styles 
internationally (e.g., Harzing 2006). As many country-level factors co-vary closely with one 
another, it may be impossible to separate out the independent effects of any single component such 
as levels of press or political freedoms. Our sample also excludes the most extreme cases of 
unstable and despotic regimes, which means our findings about the relative importance of press and 
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political freedom may not be generalizable to places where civil liberties and the rule of law have 
been overwhelmingly curtailed which may cause people to seek out information wherever they can. 
Lastly, as our analysis involves a single survey and just one aspect of people’s media habits, we are 
unable to identify to what degree changes to a country’s political or press freedoms over time or 
changes in media modes used might drive rates of avoidance in ways that may differ from country 
to country.  
However, the robust nature of our findings across model specifications are striking. 
Limitations notwithstanding, we found evidence across various ways of operationalizing levels of 
press and political freedom that such factors significantly shape how often people avoid the news 
above and beyond individual-level differences. These findings should prompt a reconsideration of 
what is captured by conventional measures of news preferences and reported audience behaviors 
when citizens situated in different cultures of news consumption may be faced with fundamentally 
different media choices. Taken together, these results suggest that while demographic 
characteristics, resources, and political attitudes may shape media habits in similar ways within 
countries, many people’s news habits quite sensibly depend on the news available to them, and in 
some cases they may have good reason to view such sources as deficient or untrustworthy. While 
existing work has often emphasized the importance of media systems with strong PSBs, the 
perceived character of those institutions, rather than their mere existence, may ultimately be most 
consequential. Rates of news avoidance may grow so long as people view the available supply of 
news as lacking.  
Overall, these findings have distinct implications for public opinion research, given well-
established relationships between news consumption and opinion formation. On the one hand, since 
news avoidance is negatively correlated with rates of news consumption, some active avoidance 
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could be cause for alarm. In countries with fewer political and press freedoms, lower levels of trust 
in news or abundant entertainment options, the divide between those who are attentive to current 
affairs and those who frequently avoid news may grow larger. This gap could have effects on 
political participation, voting, and political polarization. In the long run, as freedoms have 
decreased in many countries during the past decade (Freedom House 2018), and as options for 
entertainment consumption via streaming services are growing around the world, these trends may 
be accelerated. On the other hand, avoidance is not the pure inverse of attention; some avoidance 
may be a healthy response to particularly challenging political or media environments. We argue 
that the normative question of what to make of varying rates of news avoidance depends on the 
quality of a country’s information environment. The degree to which people have access to reliable, 
independent political information varies, and therefore news audience behaviors must be assessed 
with consideration of the country-level context in which consumption occurs.  
This analysis points the way toward future research concerning not only news avoidance but 
variation in news interest across time and countries. As our analysis is based on survey self-reports 
concerning active efforts to avoid news, future studies might examine rates of news use and 
avoidance using other modes and methods, including experiments and passive tracking data, which 
may help to identify the degree to which survey responses about avoidance capture expressive 
attitudes versus actual behaviors. Furthermore, our measure of active news avoidance does not 
specify what types of news are being avoided. It would be useful to know, for example, the degree 
to which people who use news frequently and also say they are frequently avoiding it are referring 
mainly to counter-attitudinal sources. Future studies should consider variation in the motives 
people offer for avoiding the news and how these motives relate to trust in the media and/or 
political institutions.   
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Figure 1. Average levels of news avoidance in each sampled country.  
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Figure 2. Effects of individual-level characteristics on news avoidance by country, holding 
other variables at mean levels. Gray lines depict linear models for each country; dark black lines 
depict multilevel models. Full output provided in the supplementary online appendices (Table B-1). 
“High” and “low” levels for each variable refer to one standard deviation above and below the 
mean value in the sample. 
 
Figure 3. Standardized effects of press freedom on news avoidance from multilevel models. 
Coefficients from separate models depicted with 95% confidence intervals. All models include 
individual-level controls. Full output in the supplementary online appendices (Table B-3). 
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Figure 4. Effects of political freedom and stability on news avoidance. Coefficients from 
separate multilevel models depicted with 95% confidence intervals. All models include individual 
control variables. Full output in supplementary online appendices (Table B-4). 
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Figure 5. Effects of political information environment variables on news avoidance from 
multilevel regression models. Coefficients from separate models depicted with 95% confidence 
intervals. All models include individual-level control variables. Outputs for referenced models 
provided in the supplementary online appendices (Tables B-5, B-6 and B-7, respectively). 
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Table 1. Description of Respondent-Level Measures 
Category Variable Description 
Demographics Age Age of survey respondents 
 Gender Indicator (1 = Female, 0 = Male) 
 Education Ordinal scale (from 1 to 5) for highest level 
of education achieved, corresponding to “did 
not complete secondary/high school” through 
“Masters or Doctoral degree” 
Political attitudes Ideology Self-reported placement on a left-right scale 
(from -3 to 3) corresponding to slightly, 
somewhat, or strongly right (left). 
Respondents reporting “center” or “don’t 
know” are coded as 0.  
 Internal political efficacy Composite scale (from 2 to 10) combining 
responses to “I feel that I have a pretty good 
understanding of the important political 
issues facing our country” and “I consider 
myself well-qualified to participate in 
politics.” (Cronbach’s  = 0.78) 
 Trust in news Ordinal scale (from 1 to 5) of responses to 
the statement: “I think you can trust most 
news most of the time” 
Genre preferences Relative preferences for 
“soft” versus “hard” new 
categories 
Ratio (logged and standardized) of average 
interest in news about soft news topics 
(Cronbach’s  = 0.68) divided by average 
interest in hard news topics (Cronbach’s  = 
0.73). Interest in each type of news was 
measured on a 1-5 scale. 
Social Media Use Uses social media for news Indicator coded as 1 or 0 for whether 
respondents said during the previous week 
they had “used social media and came across 
news that way (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, 
LinkedIn).”  
 Uses social media as main 
source of news 
Indicator coded as 1 or 0 for whether 
respondents selected “used social media and 
came across news that way (e.g. Facebook, 
Twitter, LinkedIn)” as the “main” way they 
“came across news in the last week.” 
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Table 2. Description of Country-Level Variables 
Category Variable Description Source N 
Press freedom Press freedom index Freedom available to journalists as reported in expert surveys. RSF 35 
 Media independence Country-level mean of respondents’ perceptions of how independent 
the news media is from undue business and governmental influence  
DNR 35 
 Voice and 
accountability index 
Composite measure of levels of freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, free press, and how well citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government. 
WGI 35 
Political freedom Democracy index Weighted average of experts’ assessments on 60 indicators concerning 
electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of 
government; political participation; and political culture.   
EIU 35 
 Rule of Law Composite measure of quality of contract enforcement, property 




Measure of perceived levels of public sector corruption according to 
experts and businesspeople. 
TI 35 
 Political Stability Composite measure of perceptions of the likelihood of political 
instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. 
WGI 35 
Info environment Market share of PSBs Daily audience market share of public radio and television. EAO 35 
 Newspaper reach Combined circulation of newspapers (2014) as a percentage of the 
country’s overall population. 
WPT 24 
 Variety in media 
environment 
Country-level mean number of news brands respondents said they 
used online or offline during the previous week 
DNR 35 
 
Notes: More details about each measure are provided in the original sources referenced in the text. DNR refers to the Digital News 
Report. EAO refers to the European Audiovisual Observatory. EIU refers to the Economist Intelligence Unit; RSF refers to Reporters 
Sans Frontières. TI refers to Transparency International. WGI refers to the Worldwide Governance Indicators published by the World 
Bank. WPT refers to the World Press Trends published by the World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers.
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Appendix A: Tables of Descriptive Data 
 
Table A-1. Descriptive Data for Respondent-Level Measures 
Variable Globally Range of Means by 
Country 
Frequency of actively avoiding news  
[0, 3] where 0 = “never” 
M = 0.94 (SD = 0.96) Min = 0.28, Max = 1.60  
Age  
(in years) 
M = 45.6 (SD = 15.6) Min = 39.3, Max = 49.6 
Gender  
(% female) 
51.1 Min = 44.8, Max = 55.6 
Education  
[1, 5] where 5 = postgraduate degree 
M = 3.14 (SD = 1.18) Min = 2.00, Max = 3.60 
Ideology  
[-3, 3] where 3 = “very rightwing” 
M = -0.1 (SD = 1.3) Min = -0.52, Max = 0.19 
Internal political efficacy 
[2, 10] where 10 = high 
M = 6.45 (SD = 1.99) Min = 5.51, Max = 7.42 
Trust in news 
[1, 5] where 5 = high 
M = 3.14 (SD = 1.01) Min = 2.76, Max = 3.51 
Rel. preference for soft over hard news 
[-6.0, 5.79] 
M = 0 (SD = 1) Min = -0.44, Max = 0.51 
Uses social media for news 
(1 = “yes”) 
M = 0.54 (SD = 0.50) Min = 0.29, Max = 0.75 
Uses SM as main news source 
(1 = “yes”) 
M = 0.14 (SD = 0.34) Min = 0.05, Max = 0.28 
Frequency of news use 
[-3.4, 1.55]  
M = 0 (SD = 1) Min = -0.36, Max = 0.64 
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Table A-2. Descriptive Data for Country-Level Measures 
Category Variable Range of Means by 
Country 
Press Freedom Press Freedom Index Min = -2.53, Max = 1.32 
 Media Independence Min = -2.29, Max = 1.46 
 Voice and Accountability Index Min = -2.66, Max = 1.20 
 COMPOSITE AVERAGE Min = -2.28, Max = 1.47 
Political 
Freedom/Stability 
Democracy Index Min = -3.10, Max = 0.86 
 Rule of Law  Min = -2.22, Max = 1.22 
 Corruption Perceptions Index Min = -2.03, Max = 1.64 
 Political Stability Min = -3.97, Max = 1.26 
 COMPOSITE AVERAGE  Min = -2.97, Max = 1.19 
Political Info 
Environment 
Market share of PSBs Min = -2.21, Max = 1.51 
 Newspaper reach Min = -2.10, Max = 1.41 
 Variety of media environment Min = -2.05, Max = 2.24 
 
Note: Country-level variables standardized globally (Mean = 0, SD = 1).
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Press Freedom Index            




0.94 0.65          
PRESS FREEDOM 
COMPOSITE 
0.94 0.83 0.95         
Democracy Index 0.89 0.49 0.95 0.85        
Rule of Law 0.76 0.74 0.78 0.83 0.62       
Corruption 
Perceptions Index 
0.75 0.83 0.78 0.86 0.61 0.94      




0.90 0.73 0.92 0.94 0.84 0.92 0.91 0.88    
Market share of 
PSBs 
0.74 0.48 0.72 0.71 0.66 0.58 0.58 0.55 0.67   
Newspaper reach1 0.47 0.38 0.43 0.46 0.26 0.77 0.70 0.49 0.62 0.36  
Variety of media 
environment 
-0.46 -0.59 -0.58 -0.60 -0.49 -0.65 -0.66 -0.44 -0.63 -0.32 -0.50 
 
Note: 1 Correlations with newspaper reach were limited to a subset of countries for which data was available (N = 24).
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Appendix B: Model Output 
 
Table B-1. Multilevel regression model of news avoidance as a function of individual-level factors. 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 1A Marginal 
Effect (M1A) 
Age — -0.003*** 
(0.000)  
-0.09 
Female — 0.098*** 
(0.007) 
0.09 
Education — 0.002 
(0.003) 
0.02 
Ideology — -0.032*** 
(0.003) 
-0.09 
Internal Efficacy — -0.016*** 
(0.002) 
-0.12 
Trust in News — -0.127*** 
(0.004) 
-0.26 
Relative Genre Preferences — 0.137*** 
(0.004) 
0.25 

















Countries (N) 35 35  
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Intraclass correlation 
coefficient 
7.6% 7.3%  
Obs (N) 67,245 67,245  
 
Note: Regression output for multilevel linear model with standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects calculated using simulated 
predicted levels of avoidance while varying each variable from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above 
its mean, or from 0 to 1 for indicator variables, holding all other variables at their mean values, including the country-level intercept. 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table B-2. Multilevel regression model of news avoidance as a function of individual-level factors (including frequency of news use). 
 









Internal Efficacy -0.011*** 
(0.002) 
Trust in News -0.124*** 
(0.004) 
Relative Genre Preferences 0.132*** 
(0.004) 












Countries (N) 35 
Level 2 variance (s.d.) 0.063 
(0.25) 





Obs (N) 66,801 
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Press Freedom Index -0.109** 
(0.039)  
— — — 
Media Independence — -0.138*** 
(0.036) 
— — 
Voice and Accountability Index — — -0.110** 
(0.039) 
— 
Composite Press Freedom 
Variable 
— — — -0.131*** 
(0.037) 
Countries (N) 35 35 35 35 
















Intraclass correlation coefficient 6.3% 5.4% 6.3% 5.6% 
Level 1 controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs (N) 67,245 67,245 67,245 67,245 
 
Notes: Coefficient estimates from separate multilevel models containing country-level factors and individual-level control variables 
included in Table B-1. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table B-4. Multilevel regression models of news avoidance as a function of political freedom. 












Democracy Index -0.100* 
(0.040)  
— — — — — 
Rule of Law  — -0.116** 
(0.039) 
— — — — 




— — — 





























— — -0.079 
(0.106) 
Countries (N) 35 35 35 35 35 35 


























6.4% 6% 6.5% 5.3% 5.7% 5.7% 
Level 1 controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs (N) 67,245 67,245 67,245 67,245 67,245 67,245 
 
Notes: Coefficient estimates from separate multilevel models containing country-level factors and individual-level control variables 
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Countries (N) 35 35 35 














6.9% 5.8% 5.8% 
Level 1 controls Yes Yes Yes 
Obs (N) 67,245 67,245 67,245 
 
Notes: Coefficient estimates from separate multilevel models containing country-level factors and individual-level control variables 
included in Table 3. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
  
NEWS THAT’S FIT TO IGNORE    9 































Countries (N) 24 24 24 














5.2% 3.9% 4.2% 
Level 1 controls Yes Yes Yes 
Obs (N) 45,791 45,791 45,791 
Notes: Coefficient estimates from separate multilevel models containing country-level factors and individual-level control variables 
included in Table 3. # p < .10, *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
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Table B-7. Multilevel regression models of news avoidance as a function of the political information environment (Variety of news 
































Countries (N) 35 35 35 














6.4% 5.7% 5.7% 
Level 1 controls Yes Yes Yes 
Obs (N) 67,245 67,245 67,245 
 
Notes: Coefficient estimates from separate multilevel models containing country-level factors and individual-level control variables 
included in Table 3. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
 
